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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The sole issue presented by this appeal is whether Sandy City (the "City"), despite the 
broad legislative grant of general welfare powers and specific legislative authority to construct 
storm sewers and collect revenues from the storm sewer services which it provides to all 
property owners within the City, is precluded by Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-106(2)(c) from 
charging the Jordan School District (the "District") for storm sewer drainage utility fees. 
This is the only question presented to the trial court by the cross-motions for summary 
judgment of the parties. (R. 34-48.) StatutoiT interpretation presents questions of law which 
this Court reviews for correctness. Parks v. Utah Transit Authority, 2002 U T 55,11 4, 2002 
WL130I656. 
PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTION. STATUTES. 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 
The section requiring construction is Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-106(2)(c): 
(2) A school district is subject to a municipality's land use regulations 
under this chapter, except that a municipality may not: 
* * * 
(c) require a district to pay kcs not authorized by this section; 
1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This matter was presented to the trial court as a declaratory judgment action for a 
determination of whether the City has the authority to charge the District a storm sewer 
drainage utility fee (the "Utility Fee") pursuant to City ordinance. The core issue in dispute 
between the parties is whether a relatively narrow provision of the Municipal Land Use 
Development and Management Act addressing various issues related to local government land 
use regulation of property owned by other units of government, including the extent to which 
a school district is subject to a municipality's land use regulations, may be applied outside the 
scope of that statute to broadly prohibit the City from charging the District the Utility Fee for 
services which it provides not only to the District but to all property owners within the City. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEED]>'< ,S 
Because the material facts were undisputed and the core issue presented a question of 
statutory construction as a matter of law, the parties filed cross-motions for partial summary 
judgment on that narrow legal question. After consideration of the memoranda and oral 
arguments of the parties, the trial court granted the City's motion and denied the District's 
motion, ruling that § 10-9-106(2)(c) did not prohibit the City's collection of the Utility Fee. 
The Partial Summary Judgment and Order was entered on November 1, 2001. (R. ] 05-07.) 
After the trial court granted partial summary judgment to the City, the parties stipulated 
to dismissal of the remaining claims without prejudice in order to permit timely appellate 
review of the trial court's legal ruling. (R. ] 08-110.) 
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C. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Managing storm water runoff is a substantial challenge for all municipalities throughout 
the State of Utah. To deal with these issues, the Sandy City Council on May 11, 1999, 
adopted Ordinance No. 99-] 6 establishing a storm sewer drainage utility. (R. 42.) The 
purposes for creating the storm sewer drainage utility are identified in Chapter 2 of the City's 
flood control regulations (the "Utility Ordinance"). 
The purposes and objectives of this chapter are to: 
(a) Provide and maintain an adequate storm sewer drainage system for 
handling storm water runoff. 
(b) Provide fair, equitable and non-discriminatory rates for using the 
storm sewer drainage system which user fees will generate sufficient 
revenues for operating, improving and maintaining the storm sewer 
drainage utility adequately. Rates shall be applied consistently for the 
same class of customers. 
(c) Establish a policy that kcs should be set after considering such 
factors as: 
(1) Intensity of development of land parcels; 
(2) Types of development on land parcels; 
(3) Cost of maintaining, operating, repairing and improving the 
svstem; 
(4) Quantity and quality of the run-off generated; 
(5) Public health, safety and welfare; and 
(6) Any other factors that should be considered. 
(d) Establish standards and guidelines for the discharge of storm water 
which comply with the Clean Water Act and NPDES requirements. 
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(Sandy City Municipal Code § 17-2-1, R. 43. A copy of the entire Utility Ordinance is 
attached as Addendum A.) The Utility Ordinance permits the City Council to impose storm 
sewer drainage kcs (the "Utility Fee35) and identifies the purposes to which the fees should be 
applied. 
The charges shall fund the administration, planning design, construction, 
water quality programming- operation, maintenance and repair of 
existing and future storm water facilities. 
(Sandy City Municipal Code § 17-2-6, R. 45-46; Addendum A.) The City does not charge 
a "hook-up55 or connection fee for initial connection to the storm sewer drainage system.1 
Contrary to the argument it now advances on appeal, the District acknowledged and specifically 
alleged in its amended complaint that the Utility Fee is not an impact fee or a tax. (R. 18,Wl 
15-16.) 
The Utility Ordinance also provides for a reduction of the Utility Fee for on-site 
mitigation of storm water runoff (R. 46; Addendum A.) and for regional mitigation credits 
through storm water facilities that satisfy the City's design and maintenance standards. (R. 47; 
Addendum A.) A non-residential customer also has the right to appeal the utility fee and 
receive an adjustment pursuant to the Utility Ordinance. (R. 48; Addendum A.) The District 
has not pursued any of these administrative remedies or alternatives for reduction of the Utility 
]The District's brief incorrectly implies that the City charges a "hook-up fee55 which 
is applied to the same purposes as the monthly utility fee. (Appellant's Brief pp. 2-3.) The 
record citation is to the District's amended complaint, but not to any primary record which 
would support the statement. The statement shows obvious confusion between a water 
connection fee and what is inaccurately described as a storm drain "hook-up fee.55 In fact, 
the $3,439 charge was for a culinary water connection fee (R. 6) which is a totally separate 
and independent utility from the storm sewer drainage utility. 
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Fee based upon its alleged on-site retention of storm water or construction of storm drainage 
facilities. 
Sandy City's creation of a storm sewer drainage utility is not a unique solution to the 
creation and operation of a storm sewer drainage system. For example, Salt Lake City 
(R. 73-79) and Orem City (R. 80-87) both have enacted similar ordinances to deal with the 
problems associated with storm water runoff and to fund ongoing operation and maintenance 
of such drainage systems. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
At the heart of this appeal is a question of law based upon the trial court's construction 
of statutory language. Proper application of the rules of statutory construction to the language 
in the context of Utah Code Ann. § I0-9-I06(2)(c) would limit the statutory provision to 
preventing a municipality from charging a school district for land use development fees, such 
as fees for site plan approval or building permits, which are not specifically authorized by that 
section. That interpretation avoids artificially creating an unnecessary conflict with other 
related statues and would give meaning and effect to the legislative intent manifest in the 
statutoiy language. On the other hand, adopting the District's interpretation would lead to the 
nonsensical conclusion that a school district could avoid payment for all of the municipal 
services it receives, such as water, sewer, electrical power, etc. 
In its operation of the storm sewer drainage utility, the City provides a utility sendee for 
which it charges a monthly utility fee. Its decision to do so is a result of the legislative process 
aimed at dealing adequately and fairly with the problem of managing storm water runoff, not 
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only arising from new development but also related to storm runoff from existing development 
throughout the City. The Utility Fee is not a means of generating revenue for capital 
improvements necessitated by new development. This is not an impact fee masquerading as 
a utility fee. It is a true fee for services rendered, the proceeds of which are used to operate, 
maintain and improve the utility svstem. The Court historically defers to this type of legislative 
judgment and affords municipalities broad discretion in dealing writh problems unique to each 
municipality and it is appropriate to do so in this case. 
The trial court correctly construed the statutory language in a manner that gives effect 
to legislative intent, which avoids unnecessary statutory conflicts and comports with existing 
case law. Because the trial court's interpretation is legally correct, it merits affirmation. 
ARGUMENT 
I. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-106(2)(c) DOES NOT PROHIBIT THE CITY'S 
COLLECTION FROM THE D1STRJCT OF THE STORM SEWER 
DRAINAGE UTILITY FEE. 
There is no question that the City has authority to construct a storm sewer drainage 
svstem and to charge utility kcs for the use of the svstem. Utah Code Ann. § 10-8-84 
(granting municipalities broad general welfare powers); Utah Code Ann. § 17A-3-304, 
(granting power to construct storm sewers and collect revenues from the sendees). Sec also 
Home Builder's Ass'n of Greater Salt Lake v. Provo City, 503 P.2d 451,452 (Utah 1972) (city 
had statutory to exact reasonable charge for sewer services). The sole question before this 
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Court is whether the City can charge the monthly Utility Fee to the District for those storm 
sewer drainage utility sendees.2 
The District argues that a relatively narrow provision of the Municipal Land Use 
Development and Management Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ ]0-9-101, et seq. prohibits the 
collection of not only this Utility Fee, but essentially all monthly utilities fees charged by 
municipalities: 
A school district is subject to a municipality's land use regulations under 
this chapter, except that a municipality may not: 
. . . require a district to pay kes not authorized in this section. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-106(2)(c) (emphasis added). Applying the rules of statutory 
construction, the trial court properly concluded that the language of § 10-9-106(2) (c) does not 
preclude the collection of such utility fees from the District. 
Because this appeal presents a question of law, this Court has the opportunity to apply 
the rules of statutory construction to affirm the correctness of the trial court's conclusion. The 
Court has identified the most important rule of statutory construction as giving effect to the 
legislative intent as "manifested by the plain language of the statute.35 State v. Huntington-
Cleveland Irrigation Co., 2002 UT 40, U 13, 446 Utah Adv. Rep. 3. In accomplishing that 
goal, the court "give[s] effect to each word according to its commonly accepted meaning." 
2The District spends considerable energy in evaluating whether the Utility Fee is a 
"fee." The City does not dispute that it is charging a fee for storm sewer drainage services. 
The District's circular argument characterizing the fee as a "hook-up fee" does not comport 
with the facts. It is not a one-time fee, but an on-going fee based upon calculated estimates 
of storm water runoff entering the drainage system from a particular site. The issue before 
this Court is not whether the City is charging a fee or the exact nature of the fee, but 
whether that fee is prohibited under § 10-9-106(2)(c). 
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Parks v. Utah Transit Authority, 2002 UT 55, H 22. Legislative intent is viewed "in the light 
of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve." In re Marriage of Gonzalez, 2000 UT 28, 
11 23, 1 P.3d 1074, ]079. As a "cardinal principle" of statutory7 construction, the court 
examines "the reason, spirit, and sense of the legislation, as indicated by the entire context and 
subject matter of the statute dealing with the subject.55 Longley v. Leucadia Financial Corp., 
2000 UT 69, U 19, 9 P. 3d 762, 766. Only if the statute is ambiguous is it necessary to look 
bevond the statutory language to determine legislative intent. Vigos v. Mountainland Builders, 
Inc., 2002 UT 2,11 ] 3, 993 P.2d 207, 210. 
Construction shouJd be avoided if it involves piecemeal interpretation of the statute as 
opposed to treating it as a comprehensive whole. Business Aviation of S. Dakota, Inc. v. 
Medives, 882 P.2d 662, 665 (Utah 1994). In addition, "statutory enactments are to be 
construed to render all parts thereof relevant and meaningful, and . . . interpretations are to be 
avoided which render some part of a provision nonsensical or absurd." Perinnev. Kennecott 
Min. Corp., 911 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah 1996) (citations omitted). AJso material to the 
construction urged by the District is the requirement that statutes be construed to harmonize 
with other statutes on related subjects. "When construction of an act will bring it into serious 
conflict with another act, our duty7 is to construe the acts to be in harmony and avoid conflicts." 
Terz v. Salt Lake County, 822 P.2d 770, 773 (Utah 1991) (citation omitted). Finally, the 
hallmark of statutory construction is that the result shouJd be reasonable. See State v. GAF 
Corp., 760 P.2d 3T0, 313 (Utah 1988) ("It is axiomatic that a statute shouJd be given a 
reasonable and sensible construction.35) 
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In urging its interpretation of § 10-9-106(2)(c)3 the District ignores both the context 
in which subsection (2)(c) is presented and the importance of the use of the word "except." 
The context is simple. The language appears in the Municipal Land Use and Development Act., 
which addresses local land use regulations including general plans, zoning, subdivision 
approval, and related issues. The specific provision in question provides that a school district 
is "subject to a municipality's land use regulations under this chapter/3 and provides for an 
exception to those regulations as applied to school districts: "except that a municipality may 
not . . . require a district to pay fees not authorized by this section." Utah Code Ann. 
§ ]0-9-106(2)(c) (emphasis added). 
The commonly accepted usage of the word "except" is to provide a limitation or 
qualification to the immediately preceding language. In other words, as is the case here, a 
broad general statement is made and use of the word "except" limits the scope of the general 
statement by excluding specific items from the applicability of the general proposition. That: 
limitation, by its very nature, precludes application of this narrow statutory exception in a land 
use context to a broader range of general statutory provisions which are not related to 
municipal land use regulation. 
It is unreasonable to assume that the legislature intended, while focusing specifically on 
land use regulations, to include a provision as a small portion of one section which would ban 
the charging of fees which are unrelated to local land use and development approval and to 
impliedly repeal other statutory provisions in the process. The legislative intent in § 10-9-106 
is not difficult to discern from the unambiguous statutory language. The legislature intended 
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that school districts be subject to land use regulations but that the districts not be required to 
pay fees related to regulation of land uses and development approval, other than those specified 
in that section of the act, e.g., reasonable impact fees. It is logical to conclude from the express 
language and the context in which it occurs that a municipality may not charge a district for 
land use development fecs^ such as kes for site plan approval or building permits which are not 
authorized in § 10-9-]06. However, there is absolutely nothing in the language which 
evidences a legislative intent that the limitation in § 10-9-106(2)(c) be extracted from its 
context and broadly applied to prohibit a municipality from charging any kes other than those 
specified in that subsection, including utility fees. 
The District's interpretation of § 10-9-106(2) (c) brings it into direct conflict with other 
statutory provisions.3 For example, Utah Code Ann. § 17A-3-315 precludes a municipality 
from assessing school district property for improvements such as a storm sewer system, but 
permits charges for services. 
. . . Nothing in this section shall prevent a municipality from imposing 
or a public agency from paying reasonable charges for any services or 
materials actually rendered or supplied by the municipality to the public 
agency, including, by way of example and not in limitation, charges for 
water, lighting, or sewer services. 
Utah Code Ann. § 17A-3-315(l) (emphasis added). 
3The District suggests that the City contends there is a conflict between § 10-9-106 
and § 17-A-3-315. (Appellant's Brief, p. 12.) Quite to the contrary, the City believes these 
nvo statutory provisions can be easily reconciled applying the rules of statutory construction 
as more fully discussed herein. 
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The clear legislative intent in this provision is that cities may charge school districts for 
the provision of utility services. Accepting the District's interpretation of § 10-9-106 would 
mean that, contrary to legislative intent, the City could not charge kcs under § 17A-3-315 
because those kcs are not expressly authorized under § ] 0-9-106. The logical result is that a 
school district could receive utility services and, if provided bv a citv, would not have to pay 
for them, even though it would have to pay for the same sendees if not provided by the city. 
The result is nonsensical and absurd and therefore prohibited by the rules of statutory 
construction. 
The District attempts to avoid this statutory conflict by narrowly interpreting 
§ 17A-3-315 and ignoring language which is expressly in the statute. 
. . . the storm drain fee is not like a water or light fee where the School 
District actually consumes electricity or water. Nothing is delivered to 
the School District for consumption. 
(Appellant's Brief, p. ] 0.) The District then argues that the statutory permission to charge for 
sendees is limited to those identified in § 17A-3-315. There are two glaring flaws with this 
approach. First, the water and lighting sendees are merely illustrative and the sendees to which 
the statute applies are expressly not limited to those identified. Second, this argument ignores 
the fact that the provision of storm sewer drainage sendees is very much like the provision of 
sewer sendees which is expressly identified in the statute and which is ignored in the District's 
discussion. 
The District's other argument, that "the storm drain system already exists and will be 
sendced regardless of the School District's hooking into it" is consistent with the absurd result 
i i 
of its statutory construction as discussed above. The same argument could apply to a sanitary 
sewer system, which already exists and wouJd be serviced regardless of the District's connection 
to that system. In other words, the District could benefit from the sanitary sewer system 
without having to pay for it. This is clearly not the legislative intent. 
The only way to harmonize the two statutory provisions is to limit the applicability of 
§ 10-9-106(2)(c) to fees under the Municipal Land Use and Development Act. This 
effectuates the legislative intent in both statutes and avoids the absurd result which would 
logically follow from the District's interpretation. 
I I . T H E TRJAL COURT'S CONSTRUCTION OF § 10-9-106(2)(C) IS 
CONSISTENT WITH OTHER STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND UTAH 
CASE LAW. 
As discussed above, limiting the application of § 10-9-106(2)(c) to except the District 
only from fees under the Municipal Land Use and Development Act avoids the conflict 
between that provision and § 17A-3-315. While the District advances the possibility of implied 
repeal due to a conflict between those provisions, there is no manifest inconsistency between 
the statutes unless the District's interpretation of § 10-9-106(2)(c) is adopted. See State v. 
Sorensen, 617P.2d 333, 336 (Utah 1980) (implied repeal appropriate only in cases of manifest 
inconsistency). Because the Court can avoid creating this conflict by application of other rules 
of statutory construction, it need not resort to a result which is not favored by law. Id. 
Adopting the District's construction of § 10-9-106(2) (c) also disrupts established case 
law addressing school district responsibility for certain types of fees. For example, the District 
is exempt from fees for the storm sewer drainage system only if those fees amount to a tax or 
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assessment. Salt Lake County v. Bd. of Educ. of Granite School Disu 808 P.2d 1056,1058-
59 (Utah 1991) (holding that a one-time fee to cover the cost of improvements was an impact 
fee rather than a local assessment from which the district would be exempt). Where a fee is 
charged for a service based upon benefits conferred, the fee is not an assessment for which the 
District is exempt. Murray v. Bd. of Educ. of Murray City School Dist., 396 P.2d 628: 630 
(Utah 1964) (allowing collection of fee from school district for sewer services).4 A school 
district must pay the fee, even though some of the funds collected are used to finance capital 
improvements in the system. Id. Sec also Granite School Dist. at 3 060 (declining to adopt the 
"purpose of the fee" test which would treat a fee which is intended to fund capital 
improvements which benefitted the property as an assessment); Ponderosa One Ltd. 
Partnership v. Salt Lake City Suburban Sanitary Dist., 738 P.2d 635, 637 (Utah 1987) (fee 
for use of sewer system is charge for service rendered and is not a tax or assessment). 
Under the District's interpretation of § ] 0-9- ] 06(2) (c) Murray City, for example, would 
not be able to collect a fee for sewer sendees provided to the Murray City School District 
because it is a "fee/5 is not enumerated under the statute and is charged by a municipality. At 
^ h e District implies that it does not "benefit55 from the storm sewer utility sendees 
provided by the City because it has on-site retention and has constructed on-site facilities to 
mitigate storm runoff. If this is the case, the District need merely apply to the City for 
adjustment of the Utility Fee and provide evidence of the extent to which those 
improvements minimize or eliminate discharge into the City's system. The Utility 
Ordinance provides for fee reductions in cases such as this. Absent evidence establishing 
that the Districts storm water runoff is self-contained, we must assume that some water is 
discharged into the system. Moreover, the District also derives at least some benefit from 
the system's handling of storm water runoff from other properties, precluding those waters 
from impacting the District's property. 
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the same time, a sewer system operated by a special district or other non-municipal entity 
would be able to charge school districts for sewer services, simply because the fee is not one 
charged by a municipality. This illogical and unnecessary result is easily avoided by limiting 
the language of the statute to the relatively narrow and legislatively intended context of local 
land use regulation. 
III. THE UTILITY FEE IS NOT AN IMPACT FEE. 
The District makes the wonderfully circular argument that "the fact that Sandy City fails 
to appropriately assess an impact fee as part of its development approval only shows that it has 
not properly assessed an impact fee" and then argues that the City is merely attempting to 
convert an impact fee to a service fee by charging on a monthly basis. (Appellant's Brief, 
p. 14.) The Court should not even address this issue since the District specifically alleged in 
its Amended Complaint that the Utility Fee is not an impact fee or a tax (R. 18, §§ 15-16). 
However, should the Court choose to address this issue, the argument that the Utility Fee 
really is, or should be, an impact fee simply ignores the nature and purpose of the Utility Fee. 
The District also implicitly seeks to have this Court substitute its judgment for that of 
the Sandy City Council in its choice of methods for dealing with the need to provide adequate 
and reliable protection to its citizens and property owners from uncontrolled storm water 
runoff. The Court should respectfully decline this invitation to engage in judicial legislation. 
In fact, the court generally affords "local government great latitude in creating solutions to the 
many challenges it faces . . ." Price Development Co. v. Orem City, 2000 UT 13,11 19, 995 
P.2d 1237, 1245. 
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The first weakness with the District's position lies in the argument that Sandy City does 
not provide any sendee but only charges for the impact of the District "hooking into its 
system.555 The same might be said of connecting to either a culinary water or a sanitary sewer 
system. The culinary water or sanitary sewer utility is similarly merely charging a monthly 
utility fee for "operating, improving and maintaining55 the facilities necessary to provide culinary 
water service or handle the sewer being discharged into its system. The sendee being provided 
is dealing with that "impact55 on a continuing basis. 
The second problem is related to the first. The District pays only passing lip sendee to 
the definition of "impact fee.55 The statutoiy definition of an impact fee is "a payment of 
money imposed upon development activity as a condition of development approval." Utah 
Code Ann. § 11-36-102. This Court provided a more comprehensive discussion of the 
definition of an impact fee in Granite School Dist.: supra. There, the Court noted that 
"[ijmpact fees are a species of real estate development exactions.35 Id. at 1058. "Impact fees 
are generally defined as 'charges levied by local governments against new development in order 
to generate revenue for capital funding necessitated by the new development.555 Id. (citation 
omitted). 
5The District reveals its true motivation in bringing this action and making this 
particular argument in the statement that "[sjchool districts would prefer to pay a one time 
hookup fee or impact fee rather than a monthly fee because then they can include the cost of 
the fee in construction bonding and initial construction costs.55 (Appellant's Brief, p. 15.) 
The problem is that almost anyone would prefer some alternative to legislative enactments 
than the particular solution chosen bv the legislative body. The District's preference is 
insufficient justification for substituting its or the Court's judgment for that of the City 
Council. 
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An impact fee is 
* in the form of a predetermined money payment; 
* assessed as a condition to the issuance of a building permit, an 
occupancy permit or plat approval; 
* pursuant to local government powers to regulate new growth 
and development and provide for adequate public facilities and 
services; 
* levied to fund large-scale, off-site public facilities and services 
necessary to serve new development; 
* in an amount which is proportionate to the need for the public 
facilities generated by new development. 
Id. 1058-59 (citation omitted). 
An impact fee is justified by and based upon the impact of a particular new land 
development on a municipality's infrastructure. 
Impact fees are a type of charge designed to offset the costs of extra-
development capital facilities necessitated by approved land development. 
Bv this definition, fees must be allocated clearly to growth-related 
infrastructure needs rather than facility maintenance or backlog needs. 
Ziegler, RathkopPs the Law of Zoning and Planning (1991) § ]3.07[1] at 13-56 to 13-57 
(emphasis added). 
The Utility Fee does not fall within this definition of an impact fee. The purpose of the 
Utility Fee is to charge "for using the storm sewer drainage system" and to "generate sufficient 
revenues for operating, improving and maintaining the storm sewer drainage utility 
adequately." (R. 43.) The City is not attempting to raise revenue for capital facilities 
necessitated by new development, but to provide and improve an existing service available to 
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all property owners. It is impossible to fix a one-time fee to adequately address all of the 
contingencies in perpetually maintaining and operating a storm sewer drainage system. The 
City does not attempt to recover these costs in the form of an impact fee because it simply 
cannot do so. 
It is important to remember that the City did not set up its storm sewer drainage utility 
or implement the fee provisions simply to charge the District a monthly fee in lieu of a 
development exaction. The Utility Fee is universally applicable to all properties in the City, not 
just new development. It is not just the impact of new development which justifies the fee, but 
the ongoing operation, maintenance and improvement of the system for the welfare of all 
property owners. Even in the strictest sense of the word, the City is providing a utility sendee 
and not assessing an impact fee. 
The City is not alone in choosing this method for addressing its storm water runoff 
management problems. Many other municipalities, including Salt Lake City and Orem City, 
have enacted similar legislation for dealing with storm water runoff and its associated costs. 
(R. 73-87.) Other states permit municipalities to operate storm sewer utilities to cover the 
costs of operating and maintaining storm drainage systems. £.^., Teter v. Clark County, 704 
P.2d 1171 (Wash. 1985) (rejecting constitutional challenges to storm drainage utility operated 
by comity). It is appropriate for the Court to defer to die legislative judgment of the governing 
bodv of Sandv City in creating such a utility in order to spread the costs over the range of 
properties benefitting from the system rather than attempting to calculate, justify and impose 
a one-time development exaction in the nature of an impact fee. 
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CONCLUSION 
The City has the authority to establish and operate a storm sewer utility and to charge 
fees for the maintenance and operation of its svstem. The relatively narrow statutory 
restrictions on a municipality charging fees to a school district for land use development 
applications and approvals cannot, under the rules of statutory construction, be given the broad 
scope and effect outside the area of land use development to preclude the City from collecting 
those kes from a school district. The trial court correctly concluded that § 10-9-106(2)(c) 
does not prohibit the City from collecting the storm sewer drainage utility fee from Jordan 
District. Because that conclusion is legally correct, it is appropriate for this Court to affirm the 
judgment. Moreover, the City appropriately exercised its legislative discretion to address the 
problems associated with the management of storm water runoff. There is no basis for the 
Court to interfere with that exercise of legislative discretion. For all the reasons more fully 
discussed above, the decision of the trial court shouJd be affirmed. 
DATED this / day of August, 2002. 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
97687.1 
Jody Kv 
Attorneys for Sandy City Corporation 
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Sandy City Municipal Code § 17-2-1, R. 43. 
ORDINANCE #99-16 
AN ORDINANCE AMENDING TITLE 17, "FLOOD CONTROL 
REGULATIONS", OF THE REVISED ORDINANCES OF 
SANDY CITY, BY ADOPTING A NEW CHAPTER 2, 
ENTITLED "STORM SEWER DRAINAGE UTILITY"; ALSO 
PROVIDING A SAVING CLAUSE FOR THE ORDINANCE 
AND AN EFFECTIVE DATE. 
WHEREAS, it is necessary to amend Title 17, "Flood Control Regulations", of the 
Revised Ordinances of Sandy City, by adopting a new Chapter 2, entitled "Storm Sewer Drainage 
Utility"; and 
WHEREAS, pursuant to Title 10-8-84, Utah Code Annotated, 1992, the City has the 
authority to protect the public health, safety and welfare of the City; 
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED by the City Council of Sandy City as follows: 
Section 1. A new Chapter 2 of Title 17 of the Revised Ordinances of Sandy City is 
hereby amended as set forth in Exhibit A, attached hereto. 
Section 2. All former ordinances or parts thereof conflicting or inconsistent with the 
provisions of this ordinance or of the Code hereby adopted are hereby repealed. 
Section 3. The provisions of this ordinance shall be severable; and if any provision 
thereof, or the application of such provision under any circumstances is held invalid, it shall not 
affect any other provision of this ordinance, or the application in a different circumstance. 
Section 4. This ordinance shall become effective upon publication of a summary thereof 
and the City Recorder is hereby directed to publish such summary as soon as practically possible. 
PASSED AND APPROVED bv the Sandv Citv Council this / /^dav of ^ 
jfthn B. WindeT, Chairman 
Sandy City Council 
EXHIBIT A 
TITLE 17 
FLOOD CONTROL REGULATIONS 
Chapter 2 
STORM SEWER DRAINAGE UTILITY 
17-2-1. Purposes and objectives. 
The purposes and objectives of this chapter are to: 
(a) Provide and maintain an adequate storm sewer drainage system for handling 
storm water runoff. 
(b) Provide fair, equitable and non-discriminatory rates for using the storm sewer 
drainage system which user fees will generate sufficient revenues for operating, improving and 
maintaining the storm sewer drainage utility adequately. Rates shall be applied consistently for 
the same class of customers. 
(c) Establish a policy that fees should be set after considering such factors as: 
(1) Intensity of development of land parcels; 
(2) Types of development on land parcels; 
(3) Cost of maintaining, operating, repairing and improving the system; 
(4) Quantity and quality of the run-off generated; 
(5) Public health, safety and welfare; and, 
(6) Any other factors that should be considered. 
(d) Establish standards and guidelines for the discharge of storm water which comply 
with the Clean Water Act and NPDES requirements. 
17-2-2. Definitions 
For the purpose of this ordinance, the following terms phrases and words shall mean: 
(a) "City" - Sandy City, a municipal corporation of the State of Utah. 
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(b) "County" - Salt Lake County. 
(c) "Council" - Sandy City Council. 
(d) "Customer" or "Person" - Any individual; public or private corporation and its 
officers; partnership; association; firm; trustee; executor of an estate; the State or its departments, 
institutions, bureaus, agencies; county; city; political subdivision; or any other governmental or 
legal entity recognized by law. 
(e) "Director"- The Director of the Department of Public Utilities or the Director's 
designee. 
(f) "Equivalent Residential Unit (ERU)" - An ERU is equal to 2,816 square feet of 
impervious surface area. This is based on a single-family residential parcel, which has an 
a\erage of 2,816 square feet of impervious surface. 
(g) "Impervious Surface" - A parcel's hard surface area that causes water to run off 
it's surface in great quantities or speeds greater than under natural conditions. Some examples 
of impervious surfaces are rooftops, concrete or asphalt paving, walkways, patios, driveways, 
parking lots or storage areas, and gravel that has been subject to surface traffic. 
(h) "Mitigation"- Storm water control facilities located on a parcel, which either 
hold runoff for a short period of time before releasing it to the storm sewer drainage system, or 
hold water until it evaporates or infiltrates into the ground. 
(i) "Parcer - The smallest, separately segregated unit of land having an owner. A 
parcel has boundaries and surface area, and is documented with a property number by the 
County. 
(j) "Developed Parcer - Any parcel whose surface has been altered by grading, 
filling, or construction of any improvement. 
(k) "National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Storm Water 
Regulations" - The provisions of the Federal Clean Water Act establishing specific permit 
requirements for the control of storm water discharges. 
(1) "Single-Family Residential Parcel" - Any parcel of land containing a single-
family dwelling unit. 
(m) "Storm Water" - Water produced by storms, surface drainage, snow and ice melt, 
and other water handled by the storm sewer drainage system. 
(n) "Storm Sewer Facilities" - Any facility, improvement, development, or property 
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made for controlling storm water quantity and quality. 
(o) "Storm Sewer Drainage System" - All man-made storm sewer facilities and 
conveyances, and natural storm water drainage channels owned or maintained by the City that 
store, control, treat, and/or convey storm water. 
(p) "Storm Sewer Drainage Utility" or "Utility" - The utility created by this 
ordinance, which operates, maintains, regulates, and improves storm sewer facilities and 
programs within Sandy City. 
(q) "Undeveloped Parcel" - Any parcel that has not been altered by grading, filling, 
or construction. 
17-2-3, Sform Sewer Drainage Utility Created. 
There is hereby created and established a Storm Sewer Drainage Utility which shall 
operate under the direction of the Public Utilities Director. 
17-2-4. Ownership of Citv storm sewer facilities and assets 
The Mayor, or Mayor's designee, shall determine which of the City's storm drainage 
assets will be transferred to the Utility. Until such transfer, the Utility shall operate, maintain, 
and improve all existing City storm drainage facilities used for the conveyance of storm waters, 
through, under or over lands or watercourses, beginning at a point where the storm waters first 
enter the storm sewer system of the city and ending in each instance at a point where the storm 
waters exit from the system. Storm water facilities do not include government-owned streets or 
those facilities operated and maintained by, or for, the County or the State of Utah. 
17-2-5, No polluted waters discharged to storm sewers 
The only substance dis-chargeable under this chapter into the City's storm sewer drainage 
system is storm water, surface drainage, subsurface drainage, groundwater, roof runoff, cooling 
water or non-polluted water. Such water may be discharged only into storm sewers which have 
adequate capacity for the accommodation of such water. Such discharged water shall comply 
with the City's storm water quality standards. 
17-2-€. System of rates and charges 
(a) Service fees imposed. The City will by resolution of the City Council impose 
storm sewer drainage fee rates and charges on each parcel of real property within the City except 
govemmentally-cwned streets and storm water facilities operated and maintained by, or for, the 
County or the State of Utah. The charges shall fund the administration, planning design, 
construction, water quality programming, operation, maintenance and repair of existing and 
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future storm water facilities. 
(b) Method of determining contribution of storm water. 
(1) Contributions of storm water from non-residential parcels and residential 
parcels larger than duplexes have been ascertained through aerial photography - by evaluating 
land surface and measuring the amount of impervious surface. 
(2) Contributions of storm water from residential parcels up to and including 
duplexes have been ascertained by sampling the amount of residential impervious areas. 
(c) Method of determining ser/ice fee rates. 
Storm drainage service fees shall be assessed on each parcel of real property within the 
City (including City-owned properties), except government-owned streets and County storm 
water facilities. Service fees shall be established by resolution of the City Council and may be 
differentiated according to the following classifications: 
(1) Residential parcels: Single-family residential and duplex parcels shall 
constitute one ERU per month. 
(2) Undeveloped parcels: Undeveloped parcels shall have no charges 
assessed. 
(3) Other parcels: Charges for all other parcels shall be computed by 
multiplying the total ERUs for a parcel by the monthly rate. Total ERUs are calculated by 
dividing total square feet of impervious surface by 2,816 (one ERU), rounded to the nearest 
whole number. 
(4) Credit for on-parcel mitigation: Non-residential parcels with mitigating 
storm water facilities, e.g. approved on-site detention/retention of storm water, approved 
discharge of storm water through a sewer connection or other approved and complete on-site 
detention methods that meet the City's design and maintenance standards may be eligible for a 
ser/ice fee credit. The parcel's owner or agent must make application for this credit to the 
Director. The amount of credit is based on the following formula. 
P = 30 + 70 (Qr/Qp) 
Formula symbols have the following meaning: 
P = Percentage of storm drainage fees to be applied to the parcel 
30 = Percentage representing Utility's fixed operation and maintenance costs 
70 = Percentage representing costs for Utility's capital improvement program 
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Qr = Restricted storm water discharge from a parcel 
Qp = Peak storm water discharge from the same parcel that would result if the 
mitigating facilities were not in place. 
The Director may, if requested, provide a complete on-site mitigation evaluation at the expense 
of the parcel's owner or authorized agent. 
(5) Credit for regional storm water mitigation: Non-residential parcels with 
mitigating storm water facilities, that serve the City's regional storm water needs as prescribed 
by the storm water master plan and utilizing methods that meet the City's design and 
maintenance standards, may be eligible for a service fee credit. The credit may be granted if 
property owners have not already been compensated for or agreed to construct the facilities as 
part the development process. The parcel's owner or agent must make application for this credit 
to the Director. 
If a request for mitigation credit is granted, the credit shall be applied to all charges from the time 
of the appealed billing, and will be reflected on the next billing thirty days afteTr appeal is 
granted. 
(6) Low income relief: A single family residential parcel owner who qualifies 
for the City's low income relief, as determined by resolution of the City Council and'set forth in 
the fee schedule, may also be eligible for a reduction in the service charge for their parcel. 
17-2-7. Billing and collection. 
(a) Utility Enterprise Fund - This ordinance creates the Storm Sewer Drainage 
Utility Fund. All revenues received from storm drainage user fees shall be placed in the 
enterprise fund as a designated fund, to be left separate and apart from all other City funds. The 
collection, accounting, and expenditure of all storm water utility funds shall be in accordance 
with the Utah Uniform Fiscal Procedures Act. 
(b) Billing - The City shall bill property owners for storm sewer drainage utility 
services. Billing amounts shall be included as a separate line item on utility bills. A billing will 
also be sent to owners of parcels within the city who are not City utility customers. 
(c) Collection - Partial payments on a combined utility bill shall be applied consistent 
with the billing procedures established by the City. 
(i) Fees and charges shall be considered delinquent if not paid as determined 
by the procedures established by the City and will be a debt to the City, which shall be subject to 
recovery in a civil action. Pursuant to 10-8-38 Utah Code Ann., the City may cause the water 
service to the property to be shut off for failure to pay for the storm sewer drainage service 
furnished, as set forth on the billing. 
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17-2-8. Appeal of charges. 
Any non-residential customer who disagrees with the storm drainage user fee for his or 
her parcel may apply to the Director for a user fee adjustment. The adjustment request must state 
the grounds for adjustment and must be filed in writing with the Director no later than thirty (30) 
days after receipt of billing. The Director shall review the request and basis for user charges to 
determine whether an error was made in the calculation or application of the fee. Director may 
approve an adjustment upon recommendation of the Drainage Manager; however, in all cases, 
the Director's decision shall be final, unless appealed. The Director shall report in writing to the 
City Recorder any adjustment that is inconsistent with the recommendation of the Drainage 
Manager. 
An appeal of a Director's decision may be brought before the Mayor within thirty (30) 
days after the date of the Director's decision. Decision of the Mayor shall be final and 
conclusive. 
If an appeal of charges is successful, credit will be applied to all charges from the time of 
the appealed billing, and will be reflected on a future billing after the appeal is granted. 
